On July 9, 2005 — exactly one year after the International Court of Justice issued its advisory opinion on Israel’s separation wall — 171 Palestinian civil society organizations published a call. It was addressed not to governments, not to armed factions, but to “people of conscience all over the world.” It asked them to apply boycott, divestment, and sanctions pressure on Israel until it complied with international law. That call became the founding document of what is now known as the BDS movement.
Nearly two decades later, the movement is the subject of legislation in more than 35 U.S. states, corporate boardroom debates, university campus votes, and sustained campaigns by its supporters and opponents alike. Yet the actual text of the 2005 call — its specific demands, its stated targets, its legal grounding �� is frequently misrepresented in mainstream coverage. What follows is an account grounded in that founding document and the institutional guidelines that have governed the movement since.
The 2005 Call: What Palestinian Civil Society Actually Said
The organizations that signed the 2005 call represented a broad cross-section of Palestinian society: trade unions, refugee networks, women’s organizations, professional associations, and NGOs operating in Gaza, the West Bank, inside Israel, and in the diaspora. The Palestinian Campaign for Academic and Cultural Boycott of Israel (PACBI), founded in 2004, became one of the movement’s central coordinating bodies.
The call grounded its demands explicitly in international law and United Nations resolutions. It identified three distinct categories of rights being violated and made three corresponding demands:
- Ending the occupation of all Arab lands occupied since 1967, including the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem — in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 242 and related resolutions.
- Full equality for Palestinian citizens of Israel — meaning the dismantling of laws and policies that discriminate on the basis of ethnicity or national origin.
- Respecting, protecting, and promoting the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and properties, as stipulated in UN General Assembly Resolution 194.
These three demands map onto three distinct Palestinian communities: those living under military occupation in the West Bank and Gaza, those holding Israeli citizenship inside the 1948 borders, and those dispersed across refugee camps and diaspora communities since the Nakba. The BDS call was unusual precisely because it addressed all three simultaneously — a deliberate structural choice by its drafters.
Institutions, Not Individuals: The PACBI Guidelines
One of the most persistently distorted claims about BDS is that it targets Jewish individuals or Israeli citizens as such. The movement’s own guidelines, developed by PACBI and the BDS National Committee (BNC), draw an explicit distinction between institutions and individuals.
The academic and cultural boycott, as defined by PACBI guidelines, targets Israeli academic and cultural institutions — universities, state-funded cultural bodies, and organizations that, in PACBI’s analysis, are “complicit in maintaining the Israeli occupation and denial of Palestinian rights.” It explicitly does not call for a boycott of individual Israeli academics, artists, or citizens on the basis of their nationality. A Palestinian cultural festival is not obliged to refuse an Israeli filmmaker who applies as an individual; an academic conference is not asked to exclude Israeli scholars on national-identity grounds.
The consumer and economic boycott similarly focuses on companies with demonstrable involvement in occupation infrastructure — such as firms providing equipment for illegal settlements, surveillance technology used in military checkpoints, or construction materials for the separation wall. The BNC has specifically named categories of targets: companies like those involved in settlement construction, weapons supply, or the administration of checkpoints and prisons in occupied territory.
This institutional focus mirrors the framework used in the international anti-apartheid campaign against South Africa — a parallel the BDS movement draws explicitly, and one that its critics contest with equal vigor.
The South Africa Parallel and Its Limits
The comparison between Israel’s governance of Palestinians and South African apartheid is not merely rhetorical. It is a legal and analytical argument made by, among others, the United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid, Human Rights Watch in its 2021 report A Threshold Crossed, Amnesty International in its 2022 report Israel’s Apartheid against Palestinians, and the Israeli human rights organization B’Tselem, which in January 2021 formally applied the apartheid framework to Israeli control from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea.
The anti-apartheid boycott of South Africa — which included cultural boycotts, arms embargoes, and divestment campaigns — is now broadly regarded in Western political culture as having been morally justified, even by many governments that opposed it at the time. BDS organizers point to that retrospective consensus deliberately, noting that the ANC itself, in solidarity statements, has endorsed the Palestinian movement.
Critics argue the comparison is flawed: that Israel is a democracy for its citizens, that its Arab citizens vote and hold seats in the Knesset, and that the situations differ in origin and structure. Palestinian rights scholars such as Noura Erakat and Raja Shehadeh, along with sociologist Baruch Kimmerling, have addressed these distinctions at length, arguing that formal citizenship rights do not negate discriminatory land, planning, and nationality laws — a body of legislation documented extensively by Adalah, the legal center for Arab minority rights in Israel, which has catalogued more than 65 Israeli laws that discriminate against Palestinian citizens.
Anti-BDS Legislation: The United States Response
As of 2024, more than 35 U.S. states have enacted some form of anti-BDS legislation or executive policy. The laws vary in scope: some require state contractors to certify they are not boycotting Israel; others prohibit state pension funds from investing in companies that participate in boycotts of Israel. Several apply specifically to individuals: state employees, contractors, or recipients of state grants.
These laws have faced sustained constitutional challenges. In 2018, a federal judge in Arizona blocked that state’s anti-BDS law, ruling it violated the First Amendment’s protection of political boycotts — citing the Supreme Court’s 1982 decision in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., which held that politically motivated boycotts are constitutionally protected expression. Similar rulings followed in Arkansas and Kansas. The American Civil Liberties Union has litigated or filed briefs in multiple cases, consistently arguing that compelling individuals to certify non-participation in a political boycott is unconstitutional compelled speech.
At the federal level, the Israel Anti-Boycott Act has been introduced in multiple Congressional sessions, though it has not become law. The Department of Commerce has maintained regulations under the Export Administration Act prohibiting U.S. persons from cooperating with foreign-government-sponsored boycotts of Israel — a separate, older legal framework that predates the BDS movement by decades.
European responses have been more varied. The Court of Justice of the European Union ruled in 2020 that products from Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank must be labeled as such — a decision consistent with BDS-aligned consumer campaigns, though reached through EU trade-labeling law rather than political boycott advocacy.
What the Debate Reveals
The intensity of the legal and political response to BDS — legislation in dozens of jurisdictions, lobbying by well-funded advocacy groups, formal government designations of the movement as antisemitic by some states — itself reflects the movement’s reach. It also reflects an unresolved tension: between the right to political expression, including economically expressed dissent, and state interest in maintaining particular foreign-policy alignments.
For Palestinians, BDS represents something more immediate than a policy debate. It is, in the words of the 2005 call, an appeal from a population living under conditions documented by OCHA, UNRWA, and the International Committee of the Red Cross — conditions the call describes as those of “settler colonialism, occupation, and apartheid.” Whether one accepts that framing or contests it, the movement’s origins lie in a specific document, with specific legal demands, addressed to a specific situation. Understanding what it actually says is the minimum precondition for engaging with it honestly.
Sources
- BDS National Committee, Palestinian Civil Society Call for BDS, July 9, 2005. bdsmovement.net/call
- PACBI, Guidelines for the International Academic Boycott of Israel (revised). bdsmovement.net/pacbi
- ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, July 9, 2004.
- Human Rights Watch, A Threshold Crossed: Israeli Authorities and the Crimes of Apartheid and Persecution, April 2021.
- Amnesty International, Israel’s Apartheid against Palestinians, February 2022.
- B’Tselem, A Regime of Jewish Supremacy from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea: This Is Apartheid, January 2021.
- Adalah — The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, Discriminatory Laws Database. adalah.org
- UN General Assembly Resolution 194 (III), December 11, 1948.
- UN Security Council Resolution 242, November 22, 1967.
- ACLU, amicus and litigation filings in Koontz v. Watson (Kansas, 2018) and related anti-BDS cases.
- Court of Justice of the European Union, Organisation juive européenne and Vignoble Psagot v. Ministre de l’Économie et des Finances, Case C-363/18, November 12, 2019.
- Noura Erakat, Justice for Some: Law and the Question of Palestine, Stanford University Press, 2019.