The Setting: Palestinian Refugees in Beirut’s Southern Camps

By the summer of 1982, Sabra and Shatila were dense, impoverished neighborhoods on the southern edge of Beirut — home to tens of thousands of Palestinian refugees, many of them or their families displaced from Palestine in 1948. Shatila had been established as a formal refugee camp under UNRWA administration, while the adjacent Sabra district had grown organically around it. Together they housed a civilian population of families, elderly residents, women, and children whose armed PLO defenders had, under a US-brokered agreement, departed Beirut by sea just weeks earlier, in late August 1982.

That departure was negotiated on the explicit understanding that the remaining civilian population would be protected. The Institute for Palestine Studies has documented how the multinational force that oversaw the PLO evacuation had itself withdrawn from Beirut by September 10 — leaving the camps’ unarmed civilian residents exposed. On September 14, 1982, Lebanese President-elect Bashir Gemayel, leader of the Phalange, was assassinated. Israeli forces moved into West Beirut the following day.

September 16–18: The Cordon and the Killing

On the evening of September 16, 1982, units of the Israeli Defense Forces encircled Sabra and Shatila and took up positions on rooftops and at road junctions commanding the camp perimeters. That same evening, fighters of the Lebanese Phalange militia — allies of Israel — were sent into the camps. They would remain inside for approximately 40 hours.

What followed has been documented by journalists, UN investigators, and the Israeli government’s own inquiry. Robert Fisk, the Independent correspondent who entered the camps on the morning of September 18, described what he found in his landmark work Pity the Nation (1990): lanes filled with the bodies of civilians, women and children among them, showing signs of summary execution, mutilation, and mass killing. Fisk’s on-the-ground account remains one of the most cited eyewitness records of the immediate aftermath.

While Israeli forces did not themselves enter the camps during the massacre, they controlled all exits and entry points. Testimony gathered at the time indicated that Israeli officers at surrounding positions fired illuminating flares overnight — lighting the camp for the Phalange during the hours of darkness. According to the Kahan Commission, Israeli commanders received early indications that a massacre was underway and did not act to halt it.

Casualty estimates have varied. The Kahan Commission itself cited a figure of approximately 700–800 killed, while Palestinian Red Crescent and other contemporaneous sources placed the toll far higher. UNISPAL documentation and sources cited by the Institute for Palestine Studies record estimates ranging from 1,000 to 3,500 dead. The dead were primarily Palestinian civilians; Lebanese Shia residents of Sabra were also among the victims. Because many bodies were buried in mass graves before a full count could be made, a precise figure has never been established.

The Kahan Commission: Israeli Accountability and Sharon’s Personal Responsibility

Under intense domestic and international pressure, the Israeli government established an official inquiry led by Supreme Court President Yitzhak Kahan. The Kahan Commission Report, published in February 1983, made findings that were striking in their directness. It concluded that Israeli military and political leaders bore indirect responsibility for the massacre by facilitating Phalange entry into the camps and failing to prevent the killings once reports reached Israeli command.

Most significantly, the Commission found that then-Defense Minister Ariel Sharon bore personal responsibility for disregarding the danger to the civilian population when he approved the Phalange entry. The Commission recommended his dismissal from the defense portfolio. Sharon resigned as Defense Minister but remained in the cabinet; he would later serve as Prime Minister of Israel from 2001 to 2006.

The Kahan Commission’s finding of personal responsibility against a sitting defense minister for the deaths of Palestinian civilians in a refugee camp represented an extraordinary moment of official acknowledgment — and, for many Palestinians and international observers, an inadequate one. No criminal prosecutions followed in Israel.

International Response and the Question of Justice

On December 16, 1982, the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 37/123, which declared the massacre an act of genocide. The resolution was adopted over Israeli and United States objection. UNISPAL archives the full text and voting record of this resolution.

The ICRC, whose field delegates entered the camps in the aftermath, documented the scale of death and the conditions they found. Attempts by survivors and families to pursue accountability in Belgian courts under universal jurisdiction legislation were ultimately foreclosed after Belgium amended its laws in 2003 under diplomatic pressure, before proceedings could reach a substantive conclusion.

For the Palestinian families who lost relatives in Sabra and Shatila — civilians who had survived displacement from their original homes in Palestine only to be killed in a refugee camp — the question of accountability has remained open for more than four decades. The documented record of those forty hours in September 1982 stands as a central chapter in Palestinian collective memory and in the international legal conversation about the protection of civilian populations in conflict.

Sources

Laisser un commentaire

Votre adresse e-mail ne sera pas publiée. Les champs obligatoires sont indiqués avec *